Iran Mosquito Fleet for Mine Laying is Still Intact and a Potential Problem

Iran's strategy for closing the Strait of Hormuz has long centered on asymmetric mosquito fleet tactics. Quick mine deployment via small, hard-to-detect platforms rather than big warships. The most important assets here are the Ghadir-class midget submarines (≈20–23 operational, ~120-ton diesel-electric boats, based on North Korean Yono design). They are optimized for shallow Persian Gulf waters. They carry torpedoes but are especially valued for covert mine-laying, special forces insertion, and ambush in the strait's narrow shipping lanes (only ~2 miles wide per direction). They can bottom-rest to hide acoustically. Iran deployed 20+ of them into the Gulf in the weeks/months before escalation specifically to threaten US carriers and enable mine operations.

Here is a 2022 81 page Navy Academy thesis on the problems and issues dealing with the Iran Navy in partcular the midget submarines and the rest of the mosquito fleet.

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* 82–131 ft shallow water, silent on batteries, seabed-resting capability (blends with bottom clutter), mine-laying, and ambush/guerrilla tactics.
* The Gulf's shallow, noisy, current-swept waters favor Iranian hit-and-run tactics and make traditional deep-water ASW harder (acoustic clutter drowns signatures; subs can bottom out and go silent).
* US nuclear subs and ASW assets (P-8s, MH-60R helos, destroyers) are superior overall, but geography + swarm/mining integration forces resource-intensive, prolonged operations.
* Historical precedent (Tanker War) shows Iran's asymmetric playbook works against unprotected shipping and raises costs even when the US ultimately prevails.
* One of the US Military Objectives is keep the Strait of Hormuz open (20–25 % of global oil, 30 % of LNG transits daily). Shorten the closure or sustained harassment directly threatens the world economy and US energy security.