ISTANBUL – The scene is a Circassian restaurant off fabled Istiklal street in historic Beyoglu. On the table, a geopolitical banquet – served by some of the best independent analytical minds from Bursa to Diyarbakir. The menu, apart from a meze feast, is simple: only two broad questions about Sultan Erdogan's approach to BRICS and to Syria.

Here's a concise synopsis of our dinner – more relevant than a torrent of Western-manufactured word salads. Enjoy it with a hefty dose of the best arak. And let the table have the first – and last – word.

On BRICS: "Türkiye feels itself as part of the West. If we look at our political party leaderships and Turkish elites, right-wing or left-wing, there's no difference. Maybe a little bit part of the East… Ankara is using its membership in BRICS as a bargaining chip against the West."

Türkiye simultaneously could be a member of BRICS and NATO?

"Erdogan has no clear future plans. After Erdogan there's no clear answer for the future of the AKP party. They could not establish a normal, permanent system. We have a governmental system just for Erdogan. We are receiving gas from Russia. We buy materials from China, assembling them in Turkish factories and selling them to Europe and the U.S. We have advantages in foreign trade compared to the EU, according to statistics published by the Turkish government. The biggest trade deficit is against Russia – and then China. This is our special position – and explains why Ankara does not want to lose the Eastern option. And at the same time we depend on the West to defend ourselves. All that explains our unique foreign policy behavior."

So there's no guarantee Ankara will agree to become a BRICS partner?

"No. But Ankara will not completely close the door to BRICS. Türkiye knows the West is losing its power. There are new dynamics, rising powers, but at the same time we are not a completely independent power."

On the three pillars of Turkish society: "You can't think about geopolitics without ideology. Erdogan and the AKP decided that it's only possible to integrate Türkiye with a liberal-Islamist project. Almost two generations have grown with them – and they don't know what happened before. They are neo-Ottomans, Islamists, pro-Arabization guys. In Türkiye, if someone openly supports Islamism, he is Arabized, ideologically. Here we have three pillars. The first one is a nationalist view – we have right Kemalism and left Kemalism.