>
US-China race for orbital supremacy could decide a Taiwan war
Witkoff, Kushner set to visit Moscow and Kyiv, but US seeks security assurances before trip
The Praxian Genocidal Kill Chain -- Part 3
The Praxian Genocidal Kill Chain -- Part 2
Eating pollution? Plastic-to-cookie technology raises safety, environmental concerns
Ford's $30,000 Fathom EV Truck Appears More Conventional Than Expected
Berlin-based artist Simon Weckert explored that idea with Digital Camouflage...
Tether expands tokenization business into Saudi Arabia, starting with real estate
Ukraine is facing a new problem in its war with Russia:
It charges more than it discharges while driving
Dataminr AI tech to go live on NATO Maven system: CEO
The Most Dangerous Interview Ever Recorded? PART 2
2026 cars: George Orwell edition
Your government bought military-grade spyware and it can hear you breathing, watch your camera...

The opening moves of a future US-China war over Taiwan may be made not across the Pacific but hundreds of kilometers above it, as both sides race to seize the orbital advantage that underpins modern military power.
The US and China are accelerating preparations for potential space warfare, increasingly treating orbital spacecraft as active combat platforms rather than passive intelligence tools, Reuters reported.
Both superpowers operate secretive unmanned spaceplanes capable of deploying secondary payloads alongside maneuverable "hunter" satellites engineered for orbital dogfighting, grappling targets and conducting on-orbit refueling.
In September 2025, US and UK space forces conducted their first joint orbital operation, maneuvering close to China's Shiyan 12-01 satellite, apparently signaling allied deterrence.
US defense chiefs, including outgoing US Space Force Chief General Chance Saltzman and US Space Command head General Stephen Whiting, warn that China is developing advanced ground- and space-based counterspace systems — including jamming, lasers and capture technologies — designed to blind terrestrial armed forces early in a crisis.
In response, the US military is deploying ground-based electromagnetic weapons and advocating for orbital interceptors to defend critical satellite architecture.
While China maintains that its experimental programs serve peaceful civilian surveys and accuses the US of militarizing orbit, Chinese military patents and procurement records reveal aggressive efforts to master autonomous pursuit maneuvers, net captures and multi-satellite fleet coordination.
The emerging US-China contest in orbit therefore centers on whether either side can turn maneuver, disruption and resilience into control over the space-enabled kill chains that would shape a high-intensity conflict.
These developments reflect the embrace of orbital warfare, which, according to Gabriel Elefteri in a July 2026 Council on Geostrategy report, is the use of space-based assets to control the orbital domain through in-orbit kinetic or non-kinetic effects, movement and maneuver.
Elefteri distinguishes this from broader space warfare, which in general encompasses multi-domain counterspace actions, including ground-based missile strikes against satellites or orbital strikes against terrestrial infrastructure. Orbital warfare refers to purely spacecraft-on-spacecraft operations conducted entirely within orbit.
He adds that by excluding Earth-to-space and space-to-ground strikes, the concept focuses military doctrine on dynamic in-orbit maneuvers, rendezvous proximity operations and gray-zone coercive harassment, pressing allied armed forces to treat orbit as an active, standalone warfighting arena.
Maneuverable satellites are key assets in orbital warfare. As Simone Montandon argues in a September 2025 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Security, high-thrust and autonomous systems enable hostile spacecraft to execute evasive trajectory shifts, conduct covert rendezvous and proximity operations, and bypass ground-based tracking.
Montandon notes that such maneuverability enables adversarial platforms to shadow high-value assets, conduct non-cooperative dockings, intercept sensitive telemetry or deploy kinetic and directed-energy payloads to neutralize critical navigation, missile defense and reconnaissance networks during the initial combat phases.