Although the United Arab Emirates has tried to present its upcoming exit from OPEC and the wider OPEC+ framework as part of its sovereign energy strategy and long-term economic planning, its timing and regional context suggest that this is a political act.

With its exit, the UAE is challenging the authority of Riyadh, strengthening its own strategic autonomy, offering Washington a useful instrument for influencing energy prices, and moving closer to a regional make-up where the US and Israel remain central actors in the pressure campaign against Iran. It's a signal that Abu Dhabi no longer wishes to behave as a secondary participant in a Saudi-centered order that has shaped the Gulf oil system for decades.

Economic ambitions

The economic explanation is the most visible one, since the UAE has spent years building production capacity that the OPEC+ framework did not allow it to use fully. Abu Dhabi's production capacity is estimated at around 4.85 million barrels per day (bpd), while the country has been moving toward a target of 5 million bpd by 2027, although before the latest regional shock it was producing around 3.4 million bpd and remained close to its effective OPEC+ ceiling. This created a growing contradiction, because Abu Dhabi had already built the industrial, financial, and logistical architecture for a larger role in the oil market, while the collective rules of the cartel forced it to operate as though its ambitions and capabilities were still limited.

The first and most cautious scenario is a gradual release of restrained supply, in which the UAE, once export routes are stabilized and infrastructure disrupted by the Iran war is restored, could add several hundred thousand bpd to the market without immediately provoking a full-scale price war. Such a path would allow Abu Dhabi to demonstrate that leaving OPEC+ produces real commercial benefits, while still avoiding a direct collision with Saudi Arabia, softening prices without collapsing them, and testing the limits of its new freedom without burning all bridges with Riyadh and other producers.

The more ambitious scenario would emerge if regional conditions calm and Asian demand remains strong, allowing the UAE to move toward 4.2 million or even 4.5 million bpd within 12 to 18 months, while the most aggressive scenario would involve a push close to 5 million bpd and the addition of roughly 1.3 million to 1.5 million bpd compared with its previous constrained position. In a tight market, such volumes could stabilize prices and provide relief to consumers, but in a softer market they could intensify downward pressure, undermine OPEC+ discipline and force Saudi Arabia to decide whether it is prepared to tolerate the political symbolism of Emirati barrels entering the market outside Saudi-led restraint. The real danger for OPEC+ is therefore not only a lower oil price, but the loss of confidence that collective discipline remains stronger than national ambition.

The UAE vs. the KSA: A deep-seated rivalry

Yet the economic argument, however important it may be, explains only the surface of the decision, while the deeper meaning is political. Abu Dhabi is not merely seeking a larger export quota, nor is it simply trying to correct a technical imbalance between capacity and production limits, but is using oil to redraw its position inside the Gulf hierarchy. For decades, Saudi Arabia has treated OPEC as an extension of its regional leadership, while Riyadh's ability to convene producers, manage scarcity, and influence prices has served as one of the foundations of its claim to leadership in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

The UAE's exit challenges this architecture, implying that Abu Dhabi no longer accepts a system in which Saudi Arabia sets the rhythm and others are expected to adjust their ambitions accordingly. This makes the whole issue a dispute over who has the right to define the economic and political order of the Gulf.